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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, possession of child pornography has been rec-
ognized as one of the most serious federal crimes.1  In an effort to close 
the thriving Internet market for obscene depictions of children, Congress 
has proscribed a base-level sentencing range of twenty-seven to thirty-
three months in federal prison for defendants convicted of child porno-
graphy offenses.2  This sentencing range can increase drastically based 
on a multitude of often-applicable sentencing enhancements.3 
Similarly, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) has 
made child pornography related crimes among the most harshly punisha-
ble federal offenses.4  Nevertheless, sentencing judges have regained the 
right to depart from the recommended Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(Guidelines), and have done so with increasing frequency for these of-
fenses.5  Child pornography sentences have thus functioned as the equiv-
alent of a lightning strike; the congressionally mandated harsh sentences 
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 1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, tbls. 13 & 17 (2008). 
 2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008).  The twenty-seven to thirty-three 
month sentence above is the proscribed Guideline range for an offender with no criminal history and 
no offender enhancements. 
 3. For example, the use of a computer, the age of the child victim depicted, and the number of 
images or videos can all greatly enhance this base-level range.  Id.  A person with no criminal histo-
ry, who uses the Internet to download a two-minute video depicting pornographic images of a ten-
year-old child through a file-sharing network, would have a Guideline range of 87–108 months in 
prison.  Id.  (basing this number off of a nine-point sentencing enhancement for the base-level of-
fense). 
 4. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.13. 
 5. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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strike some defendants but miss many others. The cases discussed below 
illustrate the disparate results that characterize federal sentencings for 
child pornography offenses. 
In July 2006, an investigation in Europe uncovered an Internet bul-
letin board called “Funny World,” which was designed to facilitate the 
exchange of child pornography.6  The board was shut down soon after, 
but not before, law enforcement agents recovered numerous screen cap-
tures of Internet provider (IP) addresses belonging to users of the data-
base.7  One of these IP addresses was traced back to Ralph Rausch, a for-
ty-nine-year-old divorced ex-Air Force Sergeant with three children, who 
lived in Colorado.8 
Upon searching Rausch’s home, federal agents uncovered several 
thousand images and videos depicting what was described as explicit, 
“hard-core” child pornography.9  Further inquiry into “Funny World” 
revealed that Rausch had made over one hundred postings to the group in 
the span of less than three months.10  The postings varied from those 
sharing photos of young children in sexually explicit positions to com-
ments about Rausch’s own sexual excitement while viewing the images 
to other users’ requests for child pornography material.11  Rausch admit-
ted that looking at child pornography had been a “hobby” for him since 
2000 and that he had visited several other Internet bulletin boards where 
he would trade and share up to 100 child pornography images a night 
with other users.12 
Rausch pled guilty in federal district court to one count of posses-
sion of child pornography.13  His advisory Guideline range was 97–120 
months in federal prison.14  He was sentenced to one day in prison, with 
credit for time served, and supervised release.15  The sentencing judge in 
Rausch found the defendant’s poor physical health to be the biggest mi-
tigating factor justifying his exceptionally low sentence.16 
Less than two months after the Rausch decision, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals had occasion to review a similar case.17  The defendant, 
Orville Toothman, had pled guilty to one count of possession of child 
                                                 
 6. United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1298 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1298–99. 
 9. Id. at 1299. 
 10. Id. at 1298. 
 11. Id. at 1299. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1296. 
 14. Id. at 1306. 
 15. Id. at 1307. 
 16. See id. at 1308. 
 17. United States v. Toothman, 543 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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pornography18 and had the same advisory sentencing range as Rausch: 
97–121 months.19  Toothman sought the mandatory minimum sentence 
of sixty months due in large part to his poor health.20  He was completely 
blind in one eye, legally blind in the other, and suffered from hyperten-
sion, high blood pressure, diabetes, and low blood sugar.  Additionally, 
Toothman was at high risk of needing an emergency retina-repair surgery 
that could not be performed in a timely manner if he were incarcerated.21  
Toothman’s treating ophthalmologist testified at his sentencing hearing 
that Toothman would be completely blind in both eyes in three years and 
would be unable to defend himself in a prison setting.22  The Court of 
Appeals upheld the district court judge’s sentence of ninety-seven 
months in prison.23 
These widely disparate sentences for very similar crimes are an un-
fortunate, and alarmingly frequent, side effect of judicial uncertainty in 
imposing sentences.  Recent years have seen a marked increase in federal 
prosecutions for the crimes of distribution, production, and possession of 
child pornography,24 and as a result of the Guidelines being only advi-
sory,25 judges are afforded a great deal of discretion in imposing sen-
tences.  This broad discretion has led to widely disparate sentences for 
similarly situated defendants such as Rausch and Toothman, who served 
one day and ninety-seven months, respectively, for the same offense.  
This outcome is contrary to the very purpose for which the Guidelines 
were imposed in the first place—to achieve fairness and proportionality 
among defendants convicted of similar crimes.26  Judges exercise their 
discretion in imposing below-Guideline sentences for the crime of child 
pornography to circumvent the Guidelines completely and substitute 
their personal opinion for that of Congress and the Sentencing Commis-
sion. 
The Guideline range for child pornography reflects sound and clear 
congressional intent to impose harsh penalties on defendants to deter, 
                                                 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2009). 
 19. Toothman, 543 F.2d at 968. 
 20. Id. at 969. 
 21. Id. at 969–70. 
 22. Id. at 969. 
 23. Id. at 971. 
 24. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, CRIMINAL CASES FILED BY MAJOR OFFENSE (EXCLUDING 
TRANSFERS), tbl.5.34, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2007/Table503.pdf.  
(showing that for the crime of sexually explicit material, there were 85 cases in 1995 as compared to 
1,544 in 2007). 
 25. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON 
FEDERAL SENTENCING (March 15, 
2006),http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
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and ultimately eliminate, the market for child pornography.  For this rea-
son, this Comment argues that sentences that fall outside the Guidelines 
range should be reviewed with much greater scrutiny and should not be 
used solely to reflect a judge’s view that the advised sentence is too 
harsh for the crime it serves to punish.  Specifically, below-Guideline 
sentences are being imposed with greater frequency because judges fail 
to consider all appropriate factors—namely, the nature of the offense, the 
purpose of punishment, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants convicted of similar crimes. 
Part II of this Comment examines the history of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, starting with their creation and then the jurisprudence 
that led to the Guidelines being advisory only.  It also tracks the simulta-
neous legislative and Department of Justice (DOJ) measures that were 
implemented to impose harsher penalties for child pornography.  Part III 
discusses the current state of sentencing for child pornography by look-
ing at trends over the past decade in a number of prosecutions, the class 
of defendant that is being prosecuted, and the types of sentences being 
imposed.  It also looks at recent cases in different circuits and examines 
how judges have been exercising their broad discretion in imposing sen-
tences.  Part IV considers arguments that the Guideline levels for child 
pornography offenses are too high, and posits that these arguments are 
unpersuasive because child pornography offenses should not be viewed 
merely as propensity crimes, but as the deliberate and repeated victimiza-
tion of a child.  Additionally, it considers the class of defendants charged 
with child pornography offenses and argues that such offenses pose a 
particular challenge to judges because they are demographically atypical.  
Part V proposes how judges should consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors in regard to these crimes so that greater predictability 
in sentencing is once again achieved. 
II.  JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW 
The current sentencing structure affords federal district judges sig-
nificant discretion in imposing sentences for all federal offenses.27  Al-
though Congress has frequently attempted to limit the sentencing discre-
tion of judges through legislative enactment, successful constitutional 
challenges to mandatory sentencing have restored the historical role of 
judges in choosing from a wide range of sentencing options.28 
                                                 
 27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 at 3 (2008). 
 28. See Booker, 543 U.S. 220; United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Spears v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009). 
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This Part briefly summarizes the legal and historical background 
that has given rise to the current system of federal sentencing.  First, it 
discusses the USSC’s creation of the Guidelines.  Second, it considers 
the congressional limit placed on judicial discretion through the 
PROTECT Act.  Third, it discusses the landmark Supreme Court deci-
sion of United States v. Booker, which rendered the Guidelines advisory 
only.  Finally, it analyzes the string of post-Booker Supreme Court deci-
sions that further define the role of the advisory Guidelines and the ways 
in which reviewing courts must consider a sentence that deviates from 
the Guidelines. 
A.  The Shift from Judicial Discretion to Mandatory Guidelines 
Prior to 1984, the U.S. had a long history of indeterminate sentenc-
ing in federal criminal matters.29  Although Congress prescribed statutory 
maximum penalties, a great deal of judicial discretion was afforded to the 
sentencing judge.30  This broad discretion had the adverse effect of creat-
ing unpredictable sentencing disparities among defendants convicted of 
similar crimes.31  To achieve fairer and more consistent sentences, Con-
gress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),32 which estab-
lished a statutory framework for federal sentencing.33 
Among other things, the SRA created the USSC, an independent 
commission of the Judicial Branch in charge of creating sentencing 
guidelines that would be mandatory for all courts.34  The Guidelines 
yielded a sentencing range, and the sentencing judge, taking into account 
both the offense and the defendant’s criminal history, would then be re-
quired to sentence within this range.35  The SRA compelled sentencing 
judges to impose sentences consistent with the policy considerations 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).36  Overall, judges are instructed to 
                                                 
 29. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 at 2 (2008). 
 30. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FED. SENT’G GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1 (2006).  See also Douglas 
A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2005). 
 31. Berman, supra note 30, at 3. 
 32. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3626 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 28 
U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000). 
 33. FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra 
note 26. 
 34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION (June 2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf. 
 35. Id.  Although the SRA returned greater determinacy to sentencing, judges still reserved 
some discretion under the mandatory Guideline system.  In special circumstances and upon motion 
of either the government or defense, a judge could impose an exceptional upward or downward 
sentence for cases where the Guideline range was not appropriate.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–2.0 (2007). 
 36. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
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“impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve 
the goals of punishment.37  Consistent with § 3553(a), a judge must con-
sider the following: (1) the nature and circumstance of the offense and 
the characteristics of the offender;38 (2) the need for the sentence im-
posed to reflect the aims of a sentence that are providing a just punish-
ment, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation;39 (3) the 
kinds of sentences available;40 (4) the Sentencing Guidelines;41 (5) the 
Sentencing Commission policy statements;42 (6) the need to avoid dispar-
ities in sentencing;43 and (7) the need to provide restitution.44 
The Guidelines became binding; however, judges were given some 
discretion to impose exceptional upward or downward departures from 
the Guideline range in response to sufficient aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances.45  The goal of the Guidelines was to provide a system to 
ensure that “criminals with similar backgrounds who commit similar 
crimes received similar sentences, irrespective of race, socioeconomic 
status, or geographic locations.”46 
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided, in Koon v. United States, that 
on appeal, sentences that departed from the Guidelines would be re-
viewed for abuse of discretion.47  The Court’s decision in Koon afforded 
greater discretion to the district court judge than previously recognized 
under the Guidelines.48  The Court stated that deferential review was ap-
propriate because it would afford “the district court the necessary flex-
ibility to resolve questions involving multifarious, fleeting, special, nar-
row facts that utterly resist generalization.”49  Koon was the first of sev-
eral cases in which the Supreme Court restored sentencing discretion to 
district judges in the face of a congressional act limiting such discre-
tion.50 
                                                 
 37. Id. § 3553(a). 
 38. Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
 39. Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
 40. Id. § 3553(a)(3). 
 41. Id. § 3553(a)(4). 
 42. Id. § 3553(a)(5). 
 43. Id. § 3553(a)(6). 
 44. Id. § 3553(a)(7). 
 45. United States v. Minstretta, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–2.0 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (setting out the standard for a judge to de-
viate from the Guidelines). 
 46. FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra 
note 26. 
 47. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)). 
 50. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 151, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
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B.  The PROTECT Act 
The surge in permissible discretion realized in Koon was short-
lived; several years later, Congress again took measures to limit judicial 
discretion in sentencing.  In 2003, Congress unanimously passed the Pro-
secutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (PROTECT) Act.51  The PROTECT Act aimed to strengthen the 
government’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes com-
mitted against children, specifically child pornography and abduction 
crimes.52  The two major catalysts for the PROTECT Act were (1) con-
gressional concern that the high percentage of downward departures in 
sentences was too great to deter crimes, particularly sex offenses involv-
ing children; and (2) congressional desire to impose harsher penalties for 
sex offenses against children.53 
The Act, as passed, also contained an amendment sponsored by 
Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, which enacted several reforms to 
ensure that the Guidelines would be applied more stringently.54  Ulti-
mately, the Feeney Amendment sought a return to the original ideals 
Congress was seeking to bring to federal sentencing with the SRA—
consistency and predictability.55  Specifically, the PROTECT Act, along 
with the Feeney Amendment, included numerous reforms aimed toward 
reducing the number of downward departures from the Guidelines.56  
After enactment of the PROTECT Act, judges who imposed a downward 
sentence were now required to submit detailed reports setting forth find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law for their decision.57 
Additionally and perhaps most notably, the Act changed the stan-
dard of appellate review to de novo.58  This gave appellate courts the 
power to overturn any departure that they believed did not comport to the 
objectives set out in § 3553(a), which severely limited district court 
                                                 
 51. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT (Apr. 30, 2003). 
 52. Id. 
 53. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL REP. ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FED. 
SENT’G 115 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/booker_report.pdf. 
 54. The Feeney Amendment was enacted as Title IV of the PROTECT Act of 2003.  
PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 3553, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003). 
 55. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft to all Fed. Prosecutors, Office of the 
Attorney Gen., Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and 
Sentencing Appeals (Jul. 28, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-
072803.pdf. 
 56. Id. 
 57. New Chair Talks About U.S. Sentencing Commission Post-Blakely, NEWSL. FED. CTS. (The 
Third Branch, Washington D.C.) Oct. 2004, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct04ttb/interview. 
 58. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(1)–(2), 117 Stat. at 670. 
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judges’ discretion.59  The PROTECT Act, therefore, marked a return to 
Congress’s intent when it adopted the SRA; the Guidelines should be 
mandatory and generally enforced, and  judicial discretion should be li-
mited to cases that presented extreme mitigating or aggravating circums-
tances.60 
C.  United States v. Booker and an Advisory Guideline System 
The limits placed on judicial discretion by the PROTECT Act came 
to a screeching halt in 2005 when the Supreme Court held that the man-
datory Guidelines were constitutionally impermissible.61  The Court held 
that an enhanced sentence under the Guidelines based on a judge’s as-
sessment of an aggravating fact violated the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to a trial by jury.62  The Court, in a 5–4 decision authored by 
Justice Scalia, remedied this constitutional violation by excising the pro-
visions of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory.63  Therefore, the 
Guidelines became advisory only.64  Although, post-Booker, the Guide-
lines are only advisory, they are still one of the statutory considerations 
judges must evaluate when imposing a sentence.65 
The Booker decision effectively restored the vast judicial discretion 
that had been limited by Congress through both the SRA and the 
PROTECT Act.  The majority in Booker stated that the new advisory 
Guidelines were consistent with congressional intent;66 however, the dis-
sent expressed serious doubt about this contention.67  The dissent pointed 
to the Senate report following the floor debate on the SRA where Con-
gress had explicitly refused an advisory system as evidence that the ma-
                                                 
 59. Lawrence Goldman, The Feeney Amendment, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 4, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/search (search for Feeney Amendment; then follow the Feeney 
Amendment hyperlink). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  The Blakely decision held that a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the court sentenced a defendant to a sen-
tence above the statutory maximum of the standard range for his offense based on the sentencing 
judge’s independent finding that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.”  Id.  The facts sup-
porting the aggravating circumstances were not found by a jury, but rather solely decided by the 
sentencing judge.  Id. 
 62. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).  The Booker majority was a some-
what atypical combination of Justices—Justices Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  
The dissenting Justices were O’Connor, Breyer, Rehnquist, and Kennedy. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (e) (2009). 
 64. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
 65. Id. at 259–60. 
 66. Id. at 249–58. 
 67. Id. at 299. 
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jority’s holding was not consistent with congressional intent.68  The dis-
sent also pointed out that Congress again reiterated its desire to limit 
judicial discretion and impose mandatory Guidelines by passing the 
PROTECT Act.69 
Additionally, Booker changed the appellate review standard for de-
partures from Guideline sentences from de novo to a reasonableness re-
view.70  In so doing, the Booker decision restored trial court judges with 
their traditional discretion and went further to ensure that it was less like-
ly that they would be overturned on appeal.  Still unclear, however, was 
how higher courts would review departure sentences post-Booker. 
D.  Presumption of Reasonableness: Rita and Gall 
This question was soon addressed when, in 2007, the Supreme 
Court had occasion to determine the proper presumption to apply to both 
within- and below-Guideline sentences on appeal.71  In Rita, a case in 
which the defendant was sentenced within the Guideline range for per-
jury, obstruction of justice, and false statements, the Court was presented 
with the issue of whether an appellate court could presume that a within-
Guideline sentence was reasonable.72  The majority found that a circuit 
court could legally apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-
Guideline sentence.73  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, went on to 
explain that when the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission 
agree on the proper sentence to impose on a defendant, this “double de-
                                                 
 68. Id. at 295–96.  See 133 CONG. REC. 33109 (1987) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (“The core 
function of the guidelines and the underlying statute . . . is to reduce disparity in sentencing and 
restore fairness and predictability to the sentencing process.  Adherence to the guidelines is therefore 
properly required under the law except in . . . rare and particularly unusual instances . . . .”) Id. at 
33110 (remarks of Sen. Biden) (“That notion of allowing the courts to, in effect, second-guess the 
wisdom of any sentencing guideline is plainly contrary to the act’s purpose of having a sentencing 
guidelines system that is mandatory, except when the court finds a circumstance meeting the stan-
dard articulated in § 3553(b).  It is also contrary to the purpose of having Congress, rather than the 
courts, review the sentencing guidelines for the appropriateness of authorized levels of punish-
ment.”). 
 69. Booker, 543 U.S. at 299.  See 149 CONG. REC. 9345, 9353, 9354 (2003) (remarks of Sen. 
Hatch) (arguing that the PROTECT Act “says the game is over for judges: You will have some 
departure guidelines from the Sentencing Commission, but you are not going to go beyond those, 
and you are not going to go on doing what is happening in our society today on children’s crimes, no 
matter how softhearted you are.  That is what we are trying to do here . . . .  We say in his bill: We 
are sick of this, judges.  You are not going to do this anymore except within the guidelines set by the 
Sentencing Commission”).  Id. at 9354 (“Trial judges systematically undermine the sentencing 
guidelines by creating new reasons to reduce these sentences.”). 
 70. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260. 
 71. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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termination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a 
reasonable one.”74 
Later that year, the Supreme Court considered whether it was prop-
er to apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences falling out-
side of the Guideline range.75  The case that served as the vehicle to re-
solve this question centered on Brian Gall’s conviction for conspiracy to 
distribute a controlled substance.76  The government argued for the min-
imum Guideline range of thirty months; however, due to the mitigating 
circumstances of the case,77 the sentencing judge chose to depart from 
the Guidelines and imposed a sentence of only thirty-six months proba-
tion.78  The Court held that post-Booker, federal courts have the power to 
impose any reasonable sentence so long as they explain their reasoning.79  
Therefore, although under Rita a presumption of reasonableness may be 
applied to review a within-Guideline sentence, appellate courts may not 
apply a presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence that departs from 
the Guidelines.80 
The effects of Rita and Gall are twofold: Rita reinforces the sound 
legislative intent of imposing the Guidelines by affording deference to a 
trial judge’s decision to impose a within-Guideline sentence, while Gall 
appears to strengthen judicial discretion by making it less likely for a 
trial judge to be overturned on appeal when departing from the Guide-
lines.81  The result of this judicial discretion has led to unpredictable and 
disparate outcomes in sentences imposed on defendants.  In recent years, 
the negative effects of this trend have been dramatically played out in 
federal sentencings for child pornography crimes.  While Rita and Gall 
represented substantial changes in federal sentencing, they were not the 
last in this long line of cases.  The Kimbrough case discussed below was 
a monumental ruling that forever changed federal sentencings. 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 350. (“The courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than having inde-
pendent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstances that when the judge’s discretio-
nary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of section 3553(a) 
in the mine run of cases, it is probably that the sentence is reasonable.”). 
 75. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Gall had been involved in a drug ring that was distributing ecstasy while he was in college.  
Id. at 41–42.  He voluntarily withdrew from the drug conspiracy and moved across the country 
where he started his own business and led a crime-free life.  Id.  He voluntarily turned himself in 
when federal agents later tracked him down.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 43. 
 79. Id. at 46. 
 80. Id. at 47. 
 81. Id. 
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E.  100-to-1 Ratio in Sentencing: Kimbrough and Spears 
While the Supreme Court, in Booker and later in Rita and Gall, 
demonstrated an inclination toward providing judges with greater discre-
tion in imposing sentences, its decision two years later in United States v. 
Kimbrough took a big step toward complete elimination of some Guide-
lines.82 
In Kimbrough, the Court allowed mere disagreement with the Sen-
tencing Commission’s prescribed range to serve as a basis to impose a 
below-Guideline sentence.83  Following the defendant’s guilty plea, the 
trial judge had imposed a sentence of fifteen years in prison and five 
years of supervised release; the Guideline range was nineteen to twenty-
two-and-a-half years.84  The primary reason for this sentence was the 
trial judge’s finding that the Guideline range for that offense—which 
equated 100 grams of powder cocaine with 1 gram of crack cocaine—
was per se unreasonable.85  According to the Court, this exercise of judi-
cial discretion was permissible.86 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Cir-
cuit and reinstated the sentence imposed by the trial court.87  It held that 
since the trial court judge had appropriately considered the § 3553(a) 
factors when imposing a sentence, the sentence was reasonable, even 
though it did not fall within the Sentencing Commission’s prescribed 
range.88  Most notably, Kimbrough seems to support the position that 
judges can categorically reject a Guideline range if they find it yields too 
high of a sentence.89 
Just a year later, the Court strongly reinforced its holding in Kim-
brough when it issued a per curiam opinion granting summary reversal in 
Spears v. United States.90  After the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had 
held that a trial court “may not categorically reject the ratio set forth by 
the Guidelines”91 and had “impermissibly varied [from the Guidelines] 
by replacing the 100:1 quantity ratio inherent in the advisory Guideline 
                                                 
 82. United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 92. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 111–12. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 110. The Court stated that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court 
to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence 
‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 90. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009). 
 91. United States v. Spears (Spears II), 533 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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range with a 20:1 quantity ratio,”92 the Supreme Court took the unusual 
step of granting summary reversal (without accepting briefing or oral 
argument) and reinstating the trial court’s sentence.93  The Spears court 
firmly reinforced the discretion given to judges in Kimbrough when it 
stated “we now clarify that district courts are entitled to reject and vary 
categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disa-
greement with those Guidelines.”94 
Though Kimbrough and Spears stand for the proposition that a trial 
court can categorically reject a Guideline range for a “run of the mill” 
case,95 these holdings only address the 100:1 sentencing ratio of crack 
versus powder cocaine.96  However, the precedent set by this line of cas-
es would allow a judge to reject the Guidelines completely for a posses-
sion of child pornography case in the absence of any particular findings 
of mitigating circumstances.  In short, the current jurisprudence conveys 
to trial judges an inordinate amount of discretion in sentencing.  Given 
that the child pornography Guidelines reflect sound and supported Con-
gressional determinations, judges should not abuse the discretion af-
forded to them through Booker and Kimbrough to circumvent the Guide-
lines because this would lead to even greater disparity and unpredictabili-
ty in sentencing. 
III.  TRENDS IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROSECUTIONS: STATISTICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT CASE LAW 
The increased judicial discretion that has resulted from Booker, Ri-
ta, and Kimbrough cases has had an extreme effect on federal prosecu-
tions of child pornography offenses.  This Part examines the current sta-
tistical data for this crime and analyzes the ways in which child porno-
graphy prosecutions have posed a unique problem for sentencing judges. 
This Part begins by analyzing the current statistics involving the 
number of prosecutions and average length of sentences for child porno-
graphy offenses.  It then discusses statistics regarding the demographics 
of child pornography defendants as compared to the average federal de-
fendant.  It ends by discussing how the atypically high sentence length 
and number of prosecutions, as well as the atypical demographic make-
up of defendants, sets child pornography offenses far apart from the typi-
cal federal crime. 
                                                 
 92. Id. (quoting United States v. Spears (Spears I), 469 F.3d 1166, 1178 (8th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc)). 
 93. Spears II, 533 F.3d at 717. 
 94. Id. 
 95. United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 96. Id. 
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A.  Number of Prosecutions and Length of Sentences 
The number of federal prosecutions for child pornography has dras-
tically increased since Congress passed the PROTECT Act in 1996.97  In 
1995, only eighty-five criminal cases were filed in federal court for sex-
ually explicit material.98  By 2000, this number had increased by more 
than 500%.99  The number of cases has continued to grow—reaching 
1,544 in 2007,100 which makes federal prosecutions for sexually explicit 
material by far the fastest-growing offense being filed in federal 
courts.101 
Additionally, the median length of sentences imposed has drastical-
ly increased in recent years.102  The USSC releases annual reports track-
ing statistics of federal prosecutions based on circuit and primary offense 
type.103  The average sentence length for the primary offense catego-
ry104—which includes production, possession, and distribution of child 
pornography—has increased from 29.1 months in 1996105 to 119 months 
in 2008.106  The only primary offense categories with a higher average 
sentence length are murder and kidnapping or hostage taking.107  It is 
clear that the past decade has seen a rapid and remarkable increase in not 
only the number of federal prosecutions for child pornography, but also 
the severity of the crime (reflected by the comparatively harsh sentences 
being imposed on offenders). 
A cursory glance at these statistics may suggest that increased judi-
cial discretion post-Booker has not had an adverse affect on the imposi-
tion of appropriate penalties on child pornography defendants.  However, 
a closer review shows a vast disparity among the sentences being im-
                                                 
 97. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 151, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 98. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, supra note 24. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.13.  See also USSC reports for 1996–2008. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The USSC publishes annual statistics on federal prosecutions and sentences.  For simplici-
ty, many of the statistics are divided into “primary offense categories,” which are determined by the 
judgment of conviction order.  The primary offense category groups similar crimes into categories to 
make the Sentencing Commission reports more manageable.  The crimes analyzed in this Comment 
fall into the pornography/prostitution category, which includes: dealing in obscene matter, transpor-
tation of minor for prostitution/sex, transportation for prostitution/sex (adult), sexual exploitation of 
minors, materials involving sexual exploitation of minors, obscene telephone or broadcasting, and 
selling or buying children for pornography.  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY 
QUARTERLY REPORT (2008) app. A at 1, 7. 
 105. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET (2007), at tbl.13. 
 106. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.13. 
 107. Id. 
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posed, which demonstrates a lack of consensus among federal judges 
about how to sentence these defendants.  Sentencing Commission reports 
for 2008 indicate that 55.2% of the cases in the child pornography prima-
ry offense category were within Guideline range.108  About 3.1% of cases 
were upward departures from the Guideline range and 33.1% were 
downward departures.109  Only 8.7% of the cases were government rec-
ommended downward departures as a result of plea bargains or prosecu-
torial discretion.110  These numbers reflect a vast disparity with the over-
all averages for all federal prosecutions.  The overall average for within 
Guideline range sentences across all crimes in 2008 was 59.7%.111  
Overall, upward departures occurred in only 1.6% of cases and down-
ward departures only accounted for 13.1%; both of these numbers are 
less than half of the amount for child pornography cases.112  Furthermore, 














These numbers indicate two alarming trends for child pornography 
prosecutions.  First, there is a far greater disparity in the sentences im-
posed in the child pornography primary offense category than the overall 
average of federal prosecutions.  Not only are there fewer within-
Guideline sentences, but there are drastically more upward and down-
ward departures from the Guidelines than the overall average for federal 
prosecutions.  Second, this disparity is attributable to judicial discretion, 
not prosecutorial discretion, because far less of these cases are govern-
ment-sponsored departures than the overall average. 
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sonable.122  So long as a sentencing judge uses the factors set out in 
§ 3553(a) to explain a downward departure, and does not consider factors 
extrinsic to those in the statute, most below-Guideline sentences will be 
affirmed on appeal.  This has caused federal sentences to return to a state 
similar to how it was prior to the SRA—unpredictable and, ultimately, 
unfair. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GUIDELINE RANGE: PROPENSITY CRIME 
OR CREATING A MARKET FOR CHILD VICTIMIZATION? 
Despite increased below-Guideline sentences for child pornography 
defendants, this crime remains amongst those with the harshest sentences 
attached to it.123  Many critics oppose the child pornography Guidelines 
as being too strict or unnecessarily harsh.124  There are two main argu-
ments against the child pornography Guidelines: (1) that they are not rep-
resentative of empirical data and congressional intent and, therefore, 
should not be presumed reasonable;125 and (2) that child pornography is 
not a propensity crime—child pornography defendants do not have an 
increased likelihood to engage in sexually explicit conduct with child-
ren.126 
These two arguments are unsound and unpersuasive.  First, the 
Guidelines are supported by years of congressional and DOJ measures to 
impose harsher penalties on child pornography offenders due in large 
part to public concern.127  Imposing appropriate punishments is a job 
properly left to the legislature, and in the case of child pornography 
Guidelines, sentences reflect public sentiment and support for imposing 
harsher penalties.128  Second, child pornography sentencing laws are not 
simply meant to deter or incapacitate to prevent future wrongful acts 
against children;129 possessing, producing, and distributing child porno-
graphy are wrongful in and of themselves because they continually vic-
                                                 
 122. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 123. ANN. REP. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at table 23. 
 124. See Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed 
Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines (Jul. 3, 2008) (federal defender paper), available at 
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf.  See generally United States v. 
Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (D. Neb. 2008); United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 
(S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009-1011 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Laura M. Klever, Reinvigorated Judicial Discretion After Booker: Burden or Boon to 
Sexual Exploitation Offenders?, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 93, 108 (2007). 
 127. See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847 
(2008). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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timize the child.130  Harsh penalties are necessary not because child por-
nography is a propensity crime, but because harsh sentences will help 
eliminate the market for child pornography altogether and bring an end 
to the continual victimization of innocent children.131 
This Part begins by discussing the legislative intent arguments 
against the current Guidelines for child pornography offenses.  It then 
argues that the child pornography Guideline range is consistent with 
congressional and DOJ intent and proportionate in relation to other of-
fenses.  It ends by discussing the criticism that child pornography of-
fenses are merely propensity crimes and by arguing that, in fact, these 
crimes are themselves completed and harmful offenses. 
A.  Legislative Intent 
Critics of the current child pornography Guidelines argue that the 
advisory sentencing ranges are too harsh and do not reflect sound con-
gressional intent and empirical research.132  While it is true that Congress 
continues to modify the Guidelines—including raising the statutory min-
imum sentence for some offenses133—these modifications both reflect 
congressional intent and response to public concern.134  This section be-
gins by discussing the numerous legislative and DOJ measures taken to 
further criminalize child pornography related offenses and ends by con-
sidering the Guideline range for child pornography against the use of 
Guidelines in the context of other crimes.  Taken together, these consid-
erations overcome arguments that the Guidelines are unduly harsh.  
Thus, the Guidelines reflect sound policy choices made by Congress to 
impose harsh, deterrent penalties for this offense. 
1.  Congressional and DOJ Actions 
In November of 1990, Congress criminalized possession of child 
pornography.135  Prior to 1990, the act of merely possessing a sexually 
explicit image involving a minor was not viewed as a federal crime; 
however, congressional intent and public sentiment shifted, in part with 
                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Stabenow, supra note 124. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Press Release, Sen. Bill Frist, Frist, Walsh Hail Passage of Child Predators Legislation 
(July 21, 2006).  See also Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2006) 
(stating that after the third showing of To Catch a Predator aired, Dateline received over 15,000 
emails from parents, teachers, and law enforcement agents lending their support for the show). 
 135. Pub. L. 101-647 tit. III, § 323(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4818, 4819 (1990).  See also Stabenow, 
supra note 124 at 4. 
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the rise of the Internet, to view possession as a punishable offense.136  
Over the next several years, many other legislative acts would serve to 
further criminalize and monitor the child pornography market.137 
Legislative concerns about downward departures in sentencing for 
defendants engaged in viewing sexually explicit materials depicting mi-
nors spawned the PROTECT Act of 2003.138  The heavily supported139 
PROTECT Act represents a relatively recent and landmark legislative 
acknowledgement that child pornography crimes require harsh sentences 
for a deterrence purpose.140  Similarly, government recognition of the 
increasing severity of the problem of child pornography spurred the De-
partment of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) to launch Operation Predator, an initiative designed 
to protect children worldwide by enacting measures to help law enforce-
ment arrest foreign pedophiles, human traffickers, and pornographers.141 
In 2006, the DOJ launched Project Safe Childhood (PSC) to fight 
the proliferation of Internet facilitated sexual exploitation of children.142  
PSC works in partnership with state and local law enforcement, the FBI, 
ICE, the U.S. Marshals Service, and various advocacy organizations to 
identify child victims and apprehend Internet predators.143  PSC has been 
successful in increasing the number of indictments filed against offend-
ers and raising public awareness of the dangers of Internet crimes.144 
Later that year, President Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child Pro-
tection and Safety Act of 2006, which aimed at strengthening federal law 
to protect children from sexual crimes, to prevent child pornography, and 
to make the Internet safer for children.145  The Adam Walsh Act is criti-
cized in part for being a sensationalized response to child pornography 
and the victimization of children through the Internet.146  Particularly, 
critics note that Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, motivated by his out-
                                                 
 136. Stabenow, supra note 124. 
 137. Id. 
 138. FINAL REP. ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FED. SENT’G, supra note 53. 
 139. FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT, supra note 51. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Operation Predator (July 9, 
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0210.shtm. 
 142. Press Release, Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood (Nov. 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.projectsafechildhood.gov/video/PSC_Announcement_FactSheet.pdf. 
 143. Press Release, Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood (Sept. 23,2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-opa-845.html. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: The Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472 (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.html. 
 146. See Dara L. Schottenfeld, Witches and Communists and Internet Sex Offenders, Oh My: 
Why it is Time to Call Off the Hunt, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359 (2000); Stabenow, supra note 124. 
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rage over the Dateline series, To Catch a Predator, pushed hard for the 
Act.147  To Catch a Predator began airing in 2004 and featured a series 
of undercover investigations of child sex predators that used the Internet 
to communicate with minors.148  The show tracked defendants as they 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct with decoy minors and then agreed 
to meet them at the children’s homes.149  Many critics of the child porno-
graphy Guidelines argue that the so-called “To Catch a Predator effect” 
has sensationalized the crime of child pornography and has been a cata-
lyst for disproportionate sentences.150  One commentator went so far as to 
analogize the treatment of Internet sex offenders to the Salem witch trials 
and the McCarthy era.151  However, in reality, the show has served to 
boost public knowledge of the dangerousness and ease of Internet crimes 
and the vast market that exists for child pornography.152  Public outrage, 
generated in part by the show, has prompted thousands of letters and 
emails nationwide calling for harsher penalties and legislative action.153  
Effectually, the show’s popularity demonstrates that the Guidelines re-
flect the evolving standards of decency of the American public, and thus, 
indicates that the Guideline range for child pornography related offenses 
reflect clear and sound legislative intent. 
The above discussion illustrates a long history of legislative and 
DOJ efforts to impose harsher penalties on child pornography related 
offenses.  These efforts were, in large part, a response to public concern.  
Furthermore, the number of prosecutions and the length of sentences 
have increased proportionately with an increase in legislative awareness 
of the problem.  Thus, the argument that the child pornography Guide-
lines do not represent congressional intent is both weak and false. 
2.  Child Pornography Guidelines in Relation to Other Offenses 
Finally, perhaps the most compelling argument against the Guide-
line range for child pornography offenses is that these defendants receive 
an even longer mean sentence than defendants convicted of sexual as-
sault.154  Critics argue that the Guidelines cannot be reasonable and can-
not reflect sound congressional intent if they yield a higher sentence for a 
                                                 
 147. Press Release, Sen. Bill Frist, Frist, Walsh Hail Passage of Child Predators Legislation 
(July, 21, 2006). 
 148. Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast May 24, 2005). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Klever, supra note 126; Stabenow, supra note 124; Schottenfeld, supra note 146. 
 151. Schottenfeld, supra note 146. 
 152. See generally Frist, supra note 147. 
 153. Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2006). 
 154. Stabenow, supra note 124. 
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person who merely looks at a pornographic image of a child versus a 
person who actually rapes or molests a child.155 
This argument is flawed because it misappropriates the cause of 
lower sentences for defendants convicted of sexual assault to the Guide-
lines, when actually it is the result of prosecutorial or judicial discre-
tion.156  While the base Guideline range for a first time offender con-
victed of child pornography is eighteen months,157 the base Guideline 
range for a first time offender convicted of sexually assaulting a minor is 
nearly double this.158  Clearly, the Guidelines proscribe a much higher 
sentence for sexual assault than possession of pornography. 
There are many explanations for the incongruent results that appear 
in the mean length of sentences for child pornography versus sexual as-
sault of a child.  Most compelling is the argument that a sexual assault 
trial is more arduous, emotional, and difficult to prevail at than a child 
pornography trial.159  Almost without fail, a sexual assault case requires 
the child victim to testify in court if the case proceeds to trial.160  It is 
emotionally scarring for a young child who has already been victimized 
to then have to go through the traumatizing experience of testifying in 
court with his or her assailant sitting right there.161 
In addition to the impact the trial process has on the child victim, 
there are often much more difficult proof issues with sexual assault cases 
than with child pornography cases.162  For child pornography, the proof 
of the crime is the image itself, and often the only thing a prosecutor 
must show is a chain of custody between the defendant and his or her 
computer.163  Sexual assault cases are much more difficult to prove be-
cause much of the jury’s decision comes down to the weight of the vic-
tim’s testimony.164 
For these reasons, it is likely that many more sexual assault defen-
dants receive favorable plea bargains whereas child pornography defen-
dants are pleading as charged.165  Favorable plea bargains may include 
the prosecutor foregoing adding certain sentencing enhancements that 
                                                 
 155. Id. 
 156. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Eva J. Klain et al., Child Pornography: The Criminal-Justice-System-Response, Nat’l Ctr. 
For Missing & Exploited Children at 10 (Mar. 2001), available at 
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC81.pdf. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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would increase the defendant’s recommended Guideline range in ex-
change for a guilty plea.166  Since child pornography crimes do not 
present the same failure of proof and increased trauma to the child victim 
issues as sexual assault cases, defendant-favorable plea bargains are not 
as necessary.167  Therefore, even though the base Guideline range for 
sexual assault cases is much higher than child pornography cases, child 
pornography can often yield a much higher sentence because it presents a 
much easier case to prove.168 
Years of congressional and DOJ actions have shown an increased 
effort to impose harsher penalties for child pornography.169  The Guide-
line range directly reflects these efforts.170  Harsher penalties serve the 
overall goals of punishment, such as retribution and, most notably, deter-
rence.171 The government’s effort to impose harsher penalties on child 
pornography defendants is a major stride towards elimination, or at least 
minimization, of the market for child pornography altogether.  Addition-
ally, the Guideline range for child pornography is not unnecessarily 
harsh as it is proportional to the Guideline range for other similar of-
fenses such as sexual assault of a minor. 
B.  Propensity 
Critics of child pornography sentences also argue that the Guide-
lines are unnecessarily harsh because no empirical data suggests that 
viewers of child pornography are more likely to commit acts of physical 
abuse.172  Furthermore, although there is no research to suggest that 
viewing child pornography actually makes a person more likely to en-
gage in sexual contact with a minor, some authors have attempted to ar-
gue that there is at least a casual relationship between increased web 
access of pornography and decreased acts of sexual violence.173  Howev-
er, even if this argument is true, it is unpersuasive and irrelevant.  The 
Guidelines do not serve to punish child pornography defendants simply 
because they possess a heightened propensity to commit sexual acts with 
a minor;174 rather, the act of viewing child pornography itself is a crime 
                                                 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See generally discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2009). 
 172. See Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes: Societal Revulsion 
at Child Pornography Consumers Has Led to Stiff Prison Sentences and Caused Some Judges to 
Rebel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at A14. 
 173. Steven E. Landsburg, How the Web Prevents Rape: All That Internet Porn Reduces Sex 
Crimes, Really, SLATE, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2152487. 
 174. Klain et al., supra note 159, at 10. 
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because it contributes to a lucrative industry that promotes the abuse of 
children and child trafficking.175  Child pornography should not be 
viewed as an inchoate offense, but as its own substantive completed of-
fense. 
Conservative estimates suggest that child pornography generates 
$4.9 billion annually worldwide.176  Nearly one-fifth of the victims of 
child pornography are between the ages of six and ten.177  The victimized 
children experience severe physical and psychological harm as a result of 
being utilized to produce these obscene images and videos.178  The child 
is victimized during the act itself, then victimized again and again as the 
image is spread online, immortalized by the Internet.179  Viewers of child 
pornography exchange images and videos for money or for other images; 
thus, the very act of viewing child pornography fuels a billion-dollar in-
dustry that is supported by sexual exploitation and victimization of child-
ren.180  The Guidelines for the crime reflect the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s view that imposing strict punishments will have a deterrent effect 
on defendants and will serve to limit, and eventually eliminate, the mar-
ket for child pornography.181 
The Sentencing Commission’s logic is endorsed by numerous legis-
lative and justice department initiatives, which are fueled in part by 
widespread public concern and support.182  Because the Guidelines for 
child pornography reflect sound policy and sentencing concerns, judicial 
discretion should be limited to serve the deterrent effects envisioned by 
the Sentencing Commission. 
V.  THE NEED FOR GREATER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF POST-BOOKER 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES IN ACCORD WITH § 3553 
To provide greater stability and predictability in sentencing child 
pornography defendants, judges should return to a closer and more deli-
berate consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  Specifically, 
courts should give great weight to the nature and circumstance of the 
offense,183 the need to impose a sentence that reflects the aims of pu-
                                                 
 175. Id. 
 176. Press Release, Internet Filter Review 2006, http://internet-filter-
review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html; Klever, supra note 126. 
 177. Klain et al., supra note 159, at 6; Klever, supra note 126, at 108. 
 178. Klain et al., supra note 159. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1) (2009). 
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nishment,184 and the need to avoid disparities in sentencing.185  Though 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence renders the Guidelines merely ad-
visory, great deference should be given to the Sentencing Commission’s 
recommendations because they are the result of empirical research and 
reflect sound congressional policy.186 
This Part details how trial courts and reviewing courts should con-
sider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing sentences.  Three factors in par-
ticular are regularly under-utilized by the sentencing courts that hear 
child pornography cases.  First, this Part begins by discussing the nature 
of the offense.  It then argues that because child pornography is a particu-
larly graphic and lucrative industry that continuously victimizes children, 
this crime is appropriately amongst the harshest punished offenses.  
Second, it discusses how sentencing judges should consider the goals of 
punishment when imposing sentences and argues that these specific 
goals cannot be met by gross downward deviations from the Guideline 
range.  Finally, this Part discusses how the current state of federal sen-
tencing for child pornography has a disparate impact on defendants con-
victed of similar crimes.  It argues that increased judicial discretion in 
child pornography sentencings will lead to the very harm the Court, in 
Kimbrough, sought to avoid—unwarranted sentencing disparities on de-
mographic lines.  Because the child pornography Guidelines reflect 
sound congressional intent and serve to punish a serious offense, the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Kimbrough should not be relied on by judges to 
circumvent the Guidelines altogether. 
A.  Nature of the Offense 
In considering the nature of the offense,187 courts should evaluate 
the number of images and videos a defendant possesses, as well as the 
age of the victims depicted and the gravity of the material.188  Child por-
nography cases yield notably high advisory Guideline ranges in part be-
cause of the multitude of sentencing enhancements available for this 
crime.189  Defendants who take part in an online file-sharing program to 
trade images with other users can incur significant sentencing enhance-
ments based on the number of images or videos they accrue, the age of 
the child victims, and the gravity of what is depicted in the images or 
                                                 
 184. Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
 185. Id. § 3553 (a)(7). 
 186. See discussion supra Part II. 
 187. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1). 
 188. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008).  The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual dictates an advisory Guideline range based on the offender’s characteristics and 
criminal history and the nature of the offense.  Id. 
 189. Id. 
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videos.190  However, the fact that these severe sentencing enhancements 
exist gives even greater weight to Congress’s intent to impose harsh pe-
nalties on child pornography defendants.191 
The sentencing enhancements reflect congressional intent and ac-
knowledgment that the nature and seriousness of the offense are impor-
tant factors that will justify, if not require, a harsher sentence.192  As dis-
cussed, possession of child pornography should not be viewed as a vic-
timless crime because the very act of trading or viewing images fuels an 
industry that victimizes countless children each year.193  Many district 
court judges have relied on the unpersuasive logic that possession of 
child pornography is an innocent and victimless crime and, therefore, a 
harsh sentence is not necessary.194  However, the Ninth Circuit has re-
jected this approach and instead argued that creation, distribution, and 
possession of child pornography creates a “permanent record of the 
children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 
circulation.”195  In this way, child pornography does not fit into the same 
category of victimless crimes as drug-related offenses because there is a 
very real and identifiable victim.196  The fact that the victim is a child 
who is continually victimized every time the image is exchanged online 
for pecuniary gain197 exacerbates the serious level of the offense. 
When imposing a sentence, district court judges should give great 
deference to § 3553(a)(1) and consider the particularly serious nature of 
this offense.198  The exploitation of child victims through a forum that 
will continually solicit and distribute its images for monetary gain is a 
heinous and sadistic offense that requires an equally harsh punishment.  
Judges should provide detailed and explicit rationales before departing 
from this reasoning. 
                                                 
 190. Id 
 191. Id. 
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B.  Goals of Punishment 
Additionally, when imposing sentences, judges should strictly ad-
here to the primary goals of punishment: deterrence, retribution, rehabili-
tation, and incapacitation.199  Particularly, deterrence should be given 
great weight as strict sentences will help to eliminate the market for child 
pornography altogether. 
Child pornography is a multi-billion-dollar industry that relies on 
child trafficking, rape, and exploitation to accrue a profit.200  The indus-
try is sustained by people who choose to become consumers of this illeg-
al business.  Most child pornography sites function as file-sharing net-
works; that is, people do not actually pay for the images and videos but 
they trade images and videos with other users.201  In this way, the image 
itself becomes a means of pecuniary value that perpetuates the child por-
nography industry.202  People who do nothing more than download por-
nographic images from their home computers are actively contributing to 
an industry that is fueled by child trafficking and exploitation. 
There is a clear and evident need to deter child pornography con-
sumers from aiding and promoting the industry.  Imposing harsh sen-
tences for child pornography related offenses has both an individual de-
terrent effect on the particular defendant and a general deterrent effect on 
other child pornography consumers.  As noted previously, child porno-
graphy cases have, at least lately, generated widespread media attention.  
By imposing a strict punishment, sentencing judges send the message 
that child pornography is a serious and offensive crime and those who 
engage in it will be punished to the fullest extent proscribed by law.  
Sentencing judges who wish to depart from this goal203 should do so only 
in extreme and special circumstances and should fully explain their rea-
son for deviation.  A failure to adhere to the recommended Guideline 
range in the average case would fail to satisfy the deterrent goals of pu-
nishment. 
C.  Need to Avoid Disparate Impacts in Sentencing 
Finally, judges should give great weight to the need to avoid dispar-
ities in sentencing among defendants convicted of similar crimes.204  Par-
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ticularly, sentencing should not be based on the sentencing judge ran-
domly assigned to the case.205  Instead, judges should do their best to en-
sure that sentences are imposed somewhat systematically and predictably 
so as not to have the disparate outcome that child pornography sentences 
have today.206 
As a result of Kimbrough, sentencing judges can categorically re-
ject a Guideline range if they find that it yields an inappropriate result.  
However, Kimbrough should be construed as a narrow holding that ap-
plied to the 100-to-1 crack cocaine disparity and should not be extended 
to categorically reject the child pornography Guidelines.  The concern in 
Kimbrough was that the 100-to-1 sentencing ratio yielded disparate im-
pacts on defendants, particularly on racial lines.207  Effectually, the ratio 
imposed a much higher sentence on crack cocaine defendants, who were 
largely minorities, than it imposed on powder cocaine defendants, who 
were largely white.208  Additionally, it had the effect of imposing harsher 
sentences on low-level dealers, who usually distribute crack cocaine, 
than on high-level dealers, who usually distribute powder cocaine.209  
The Court found that the 100-to-1 ratio was based on flawed empirical 
and scientific evidence and therefore a judge’s categorical rejection of 
the ratio was sound.210 
The same reasoning does not extend to child pornography Guide-
lines.  The Guidelines reflect a history of sound and specific legislative 
intent to impose harsher penalties on defendants convicted of child por-
nography related offenses and to eliminate, or at least vastly reduce, the 
market for child pornography.211  Furthermore, deviation from the Guide-
line range would potentially have the same negative effect that adherence 
to the Guideline range in Kimbrough sought to avoid: sentencing dispari-
ty based on racial lines.212  The Kimbrough sentencing ratio had the 
negative effect of imposing harsher penalties on minority defendants.213  
However, downward departures from the Guidelines for child pornogra-
phy have the adverse effect of giving lighter sentences to white defen-
dants.  As discussed above, child pornography defendants are completely 
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atypical from the average federal defendant.214  Specifically, they are 
overwhelmingly white, older, and more educated than the average defen-
dant.215  Demographically, child pornography defendants mirror white-
collar defendants.216  Judicial leniency for these offenses could have the 
exact adverse effect that Kimbrough was largely trying to avoid—
creating sentencing disparity along racial lines. 
The goals of punishment require equal penalties for similarly si-
tuated defendants who commit similar crimes.217  As it stands, federal 
sentencing for child pornography related offenses have little to no predic-
tability.  To comply with § 3553(a), judges should give greater deference 
to the Sentencing Commission’s research and recommendations.  Post-
Booker, judges should exercise their broad discretion with greater regard 
for the Guidelines and not merely as an attempt to circumvent the Guide-
lines altogether. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, recent years have shown a rapid and notable increase 
in federal prosecutions for child pornography related offenses.  In re-
sponse to this enhanced concern, Congress and the DOJ have proscribed 
numerous measures to further criminalize and better prosecute those who 
victimize children.  The USSC has reflected these efforts by proscribing 
harsh but fair advisory Guidelines for child pornography related offenses. 
However, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has afforded sen-
tencing judges almost unbridled discretion.  Though they must consider 
the Guidelines when imposing a sentence, judges are allowed to impose a 
sentence that completely deviates from the advised range so long as they 
explain their reasoning.  This increased discretion has led to vast dispari-
ty and unpredictability in sentencing that is completely contradictory to 
the original conception of the SRA. 
In order to avoid this unwarranted and undesirable disparity, judges 
should give much greater consideration to the § 3553(a) factors when 
imposing sentences.  Particularly, they should consider child pornogra-
phy as a multi-billion dollar industry fueled by child trafficking and ex-
ploitation.  People who support this industry by distributing or possess-
ing child pornography are directly fueling this business.  Sentencing 
judges should properly recognize child pornography offenses as serious 
crimes requiring a harsh punishment.218  Second, judges should accom-
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plish the goals of punishment, especially the need to send a strong deter-
rent message, by imposing harsh sentences that reflect the gravity of the 
crime.219  Finally, judges should avoid disparate sentences.220  The 
Guidelines assure that similarly situated defendants will receive similar 
punishments.  Therefore, any deviation from this range should be very 
particular and well-reasoned and should not simply reflect a sentencing 
judge’s disagreement with the Guideline range. 
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